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Abstract—The need for security in embedded systems has
strongly increased since several years. Nowadays, it is possible
to integrate several processors in a single chip. The design of
such multiprocessor systems-on-chip (MPSoC) must be done
with a lot of care as the execution of applications may lead
to potential vulnerabilities such as revelation of critical data
and private information. Thus it becomes mandatory to deal
with security issues all along the design cycle of the MPSoC
in order to guarantee a global protection. Among the critical
points, the protection of the communications is very sensible
as most of the data are exchanged through the communication
architecture of the system. This paper targets this point and
proposes a solution with distributed enhancements to secure
data exchanges and to monitor communications within a
MPSoC. In order to validate our contribution, a case study
based on a generic multiprocessor architecture is considered.
Keywords-cryptography, security, communication architec-
ture, monitoring, firewalls
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, computers, smartphones, set-top boxes and
other electronic embedded systems are part of our daily
life. They contain critical information such as passwords
and personal data that must be protected against potential
attackers. These devices are characterized by several pro-
cessing elements embedded in a single chip in order to
perform advanced computations. The security mechanisms
built in these systems must be efficient and evolutive in order
to be up-to-date with the most recent standards of security
protocols and algorithms.
As these systems have a complex architecture, an extensive
analysis of their structure and their functionalities must be
carried out in order to guarantee an efficient protection.
Furthermore, a tradeoff between the latency and area over-
heads of the protection mechanisms is mandatory. This is
a critical issue as the final system must be competitive
in terms of development and manufacturing costs but also
resistant to attackers who want to retrieve sensitive data.
Reconfigurable technologies such as FPGAs are widely
used to build such complex embedded systems as they
can integrate processors, memories, dedicated IPs. All these
components are relying on a communication architecture
where all data are exchanged. Thus, it is of paramount
importance to protect communications in order to keep secret
and private information within the system. This is the goal
of this work and we propose a distributed solution based on
firewalls between IPs and the communication architecture.
II. RELATED WORK
Several works have targeted the protection of communica-
tion architectures within an embedded system. Coburn et al.
[1] propose a solution dedicated to buses. Their technique
is based on security elements (SEI, Security Enforcement
Interface) implemented in each interface between IPs and the
bus. Each SEI computes information from the data handled
by its associated IP and sends it to a global manager (SEM,
Security Enforcement Module). The SEM manages the se-
curity of the system and controls all SEIs in order to apply
the right level of protection. Other works are devoted to
NoC (Network on Chip). Evain et al. [2] propose a solution
similar to [1] where controls are done in each interface. A
global manager gathers all information from the interfaces
and deal with the security policy. Another approach uses
the interfaces as filters splitting the IPs address map into
zones with specific security policies [3]. This interface called
Adress Protection Unit, verifies if the requested address is
allowed or not. An extension to this work adds probes within
the interface structure to refine the protection mechanisms
[4].
In our work we target a bus-based system where a limited
number of IPs are connected together [5] [6]. Compared to
previous efforts we propose to use a distributed solution to
secure the communications in a MPSoC architecture. The
main idea is that each interface manages the security policy
corresponding to its associated IP.
III. THREAT MODEL
When dealing with security, one of the first tasks that
must be addressed is to define the threat model as it has a
direct impact on the countermeasures that must be defined.
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In this section we propose the generic model of attacks that
we consider in this work.
A. Attacker’s goals and possibilities
We consider that potential attackers have several goals:
• Processor hijacking: running a malicious source code
on a processor to misbehave the whole embedded
system.
• Extraction of secret information: cryptographic keys,
security parameters, private information...
• Denial of service (DoS): cancelling out security ser-
vices to stop the system, disabling communications,
injecting dummy data to create overwhelming traffic.
B. Attack vectors
In order to achieve his goals an attacker has several
solutions that must be clearly analyzed. One important point
is to define how an attacker can have access to the system.
In our case, we consider logical attacks and do not target
fault injection or side-channel attacks.
We consider the FPGA as secure so the only way for an
attacker to tamper with the system is through the external bus
and the external memory. Indeed the considered architecture
is composed of an FPGA connected to an external memory
that contains data and code. The FPGA embeds several
processors, internal memories and dedicated IPs. When crit-
ical systems are targeted, external memory is encrypted and
authenticated. In that case, it is impossible to tamper with the
external memory. However such a solution has a very high
cost, so many systems do not provide a uniform protection
but allow some parts of the memory to be unprotected or
only ciphered. The unprotected memory corresponds to a
non sensitive part of the system, however an attacker can
take benefit of this non protected area to introduce his attack
within the system. When the memory is only ciphered it is
more difficult for an attacker but he can still target a DoS
attack by randomly changing some data.
In a more general way, when targeting the external bus, an
attacker can perform replay, relocation and spoofing attacks.
This model is widely used and covers major threats on
the external bus. When targeting the external memory, an
attacker can modify some code or data that will be executed
by one of the processors within the system. This execution
may lead to get access to sensitive data or to obtain abnormal
behavior of the system. One way to track such attacks is to
check all communications within the system to detect any
unauthorized access to the communication architecture. This
is the contribution that we propose.
C. Security features
In order to cover the considered threat model and to
obtain an efficient solution, we target three security features.
We believe it is possible to secure a system by monitoring
the communications in order to check if any abnormal or
unauthorized access to the communication architecture is
performed:
• If an error is detected (we will see how later in the
paper), the system must react as fast as possible. This is
important to be able to stop an attack before it succeeds
to extract or modify some data.
• Attacks must not affect the global behavior of the
system. If an attack is detected, the goal is to limit
its impact to the IP that launches the attack. For that
purpose, the attack must not reach the communication
architecture but be stopped in the interface associated
with the infected IP.
• The security enhancements should achieve a good
area/latency tradeoff. This is very important for em-
bedded systems where constraints are tight in terms of
area, power and energy.
IV. SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS FOR A MULTIPROCESSOR
ARCHITECTURE
The considered system as mentioned previously is com-
posed of processors, internal memories, dedicated IPs em-
bedded within an FPGA and connected to an external
memory. All the resources within the FPGA are connected
to a bus. We propose to add a specific interface to each
resource in order to build a secure gateway to the bus. That
way, we can monitor all communications before they reach
the bus and propagate within the system. Figure 1 shows a
system with two resources and an external memory. Each
resource is connected to a specific interface called Local
Firewall. The external memory is also connected to a specific
interface called Local Ciphering Firewall. These firewalls
handle the security policy within the system as explained in
the following.
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Figure 1. Embedded distributes architecture with security enhancements
A. Security policy
A Security Policy (also known as SP) is a set of parame-
ters that aims to protect the system against the considered
threat model. Each resource (processor, dedicated IP) has a
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specific SP which defines the associated security rules. We
consider the following parameters:
• SP Identifier (SPI). Identifier of the security policy.
• Read/Write Access rules (RWA). Three choices are
available for data accesses: read-only, write-only or
read/write. This information is used in order to check
if the current access to the bus by an IP is authorized.
• Allowed Data Format (ADF). There can be several
data lengths allowed for a given security policy (for
instance, 8 up to 32 bits). This information is used
in order to check if the accessed data has the correct
format. An unauthorized format may overwrite some
protected data in the target IP.
• Confidentiality and Integrity Modes (CM and IM).
For each option, it is possible to execute or to by-
pass confidentiality (block cipher) and integrity (hash
trees) modules. These parameters are only available
for the Local Ciphering Firewall that is connected
to the external memory. Indeed we consider that all
internal communications are not encrypted as the Local
Firewalls protect them against unauthorized access.
• Cryptographic Key (CK). This parameter corresponds
to the key used by the block cipher module. This
parameter is only available for the Local Ciphering
Firewall that is connected to the external memory.
These parameters allow us to cover the threat model
presented previously. Indeed replay, relocation and spoof-
ing attacks are managed by the Local Ciphering Firewall
using ciphering and integrity. Time stamp tags are also
used to monitor the access time to the external memory
(replay attacks). Memory addresses are controlled to protect
the system against relocation attacks. Protection within the
FPGA is managed by the Local Firewalls that monitor all
accesses to the bus preventing any unauthorized or abnormal
access to the internal bus. This technique allows to detect
any tampering within the system.
B. Features of Firewalls
Considering the system presented in Figure 1, and as
presented before there are two categories of Firewalls: Local
Firewalls are located at the interface between an IP and
the bus, Local Ciphering Firewall is connected between the
internal bus and the external memory.
1) Local Firewall: Local Firewalls monitor the communi-
cations using the security parameters presented above. For a
write operation, before reaching the bus all data are checked.
If the security rules are respected the data can be sent to
the bus. For a read operation, all data are checked before
reaching the IP. As for the write operation, if the security
rules are respected the IP can receive the data. In case
there is a violation of one of the security rules, the data
is discarded.
The Security Policies (SP) associated to a Local Firewall
are stored in on-chip memories: these memories (called
Configuration Memories) are considered as trusted units and
do not need to be ciphered. Each Local Firewall is composed
of the following resources:
LF Communication Block (LFCB): It is responsible for
receiving and transmitting bus signals through a dedicated
interface. It launches the security rules checking by trigger-
ing the secpol_req signal.
Security Builder (SB): When the secpol_req signal
is received by SB, it reads the associated SP from the
Configuration Memory. Then, SP parameters (security rules)
are sent to specific checking modules that are embedded in
the SB resource.
Firewall Interface (FI): This block achieves the com-
munication datapath between the bus and the IP. It takes into
account some alert signals to allow (or not) data block to be
transmitted.
2) Local Ciphering Firewall: Local Ciphering Firewall
(LCF) monitors the exchanges between internal IPs and the
external memory. The main feature of LCF is the protection
of the external memory in terms of confidentiality and
integrity (each feature has its own module in the LCF in-
ternal architecture). The architecture of the Local Ciphering
Firewall is similar to the LF one except the ciphering and
integrity modules that are not available in Local Firewall.
Confidentiality Core: This module is responsible for ci-
phering operations. This core is based on a AES (Advanced
Encryption Standard) algorithm with 128-bits key.
Integrity Core: This module is based on hash-trees.
Figure 1 shows the connection between the IPs and
the Local Firewall and the Local Ciphering Firewall. The
internal architecture of the Local Firewall is also detailed.
We can see the various resources used to manage the security
within the interface.
V. IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS
The considered architecture has been implemented
on a ML605 development board from Xilinx (with a
XC6VLX240T1136-1 FPGA). This device has around
240,000 logic cells and 15 Mb RAM blocks. In order to
evaluate the performances of the proposed solution, a study
in terms of consumed area and observed latency on the
FPGA is proposed.
This work discusses the implementation results of our
security enhancements within a multiprocessor architecture.
This system contains 3 MicroBlaze softcore microproces-
sors, One internal shared memory (BRAM blocks), one
external memory (DDR RAM) and one dedicated IP.
A. Synthesis results
In order to estimate the area overhead added by the
firewalls, we compare the area occupied by the system
without and with firewalls. Results are given in Table I.
The overheads given in the second line, show the costs
in terms of area due to the firewalls for the considered
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Slice Slice F. used LUT #
Regs LUTs FFs pairs BRAMs
Generic 12,895 11,474 15,473 53
w/o firewalls
Generic 15,833 19,554 21,530 63
w/ firewalls +13.43% +34.40% +26.50% +18.87%
Local SB 0 393 393 0
Firewall CC 436 986 344 10
IC 1,224 1,404 1,704 0
Local 8 403 403 0
Firewall
Table I
SYNTHESIS RESULTS OF THE MULTIPROCESSOR SYSTEM
case study. We can observe an overhead of 13.43% for
the slice registers. This cost is not negligible however as
expected most of the area is devoted to the confidentiality
and Integrity Cores (about 90% of Local Ciphering Firewall
area). The interesting point is that the cost of Local Firewalls
is limited. The cost of firewalls is also related to the number
of security rules that must be monitor. A more aggresive
security policy will lead to a larger cost in terms of area.
This point will be further analyzed in future work.
Table II shows the overhead in terms of latency due to the
various modules within the firewalls. We can observe that
the security rules checking requires 12 cycles, the ciphering
operation 11 cycles and the integrity checking 20 cycles. The
impact of the protection mechanisms on the global execution
time depends on the percentage of computation time versus
communication time. Furthermore the latency overhead is
also impacted by the percentage of internal communication
versus external communication (i.e. communication with the
external memory). Indeed external communications have
a larger overhead due to the cryptography resources so
promoting internal computation and communication will
improve the overall performance.
Nb. of Throughput
clk cycles (Mb/s)
SB 12 -
(LF/LCF) CC 11 450
IC 20 131
Table II
LATENCY RESULTS OF THE FIREWALLS
The implementations results underline some interesting
points:
• Most of the controls are done locally within the
firewalls: it implies a low latency overhead for the
communication.
• The implementation of a firewall at each IP interface
leads to a limited area overhead. This is not the case for
the area of the Local Ciphering Firewall that is rather
high due the confidentiality and integrity cores.
VI. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
This paper provides a solution to secure communica-
tions within a multiprocessor architecture. This work offers
distributed security enhancements that embed protection
mechanisms where existing solutions are mainly centralized.
Our solution is a layer above the communication protocol as
our security enhancements do not modify the communication
protocol between the processors and the other parts of the
systems. The application designer does not have to deal
with the security mechanisms as they are embedded within
the hardware architecture. The latency and area costs will
be further analyzed in our future work in order to provide
an extensive discussion of costs in relation with security
rules and security policies. We also plan to integrate recon-
figuration of security services (i.e. modification of security
policies) to counter some attacks against the system. In this
work, policies are defined using the address spaces, it can be
interesting to study the adaptation to thread-specific security
where each thread has its own security level.
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